

LINGNAN UNIVERSITY AND EDUCATION UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG
COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH POSTGRADUATE STUDIES SEMINAR SERIES
LECTURE NO.2

GOVERNANCE RESEARCH ON GREATER BAY AREA COLLABORATION

WANG XiaoHu, City University of Hong Kong



OVERVIEW


- I started collaborative governance research more than a decade ago; the focus on the GBA about five years ago
- Three ongoing research projects related to GBA collaborations
 - On collaborative disputes
 - On contextual influences
 - On the external imposition (central government role)
- Funded by two GRFs and several other smaller grants
- Theoretical advancement as the main focus with significant policy implications

OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)

- Research team (CityU, Fudan U. Education U, Bank of China, and others)
- Hong Kong as the research and data base
- Research outcomes: 3 English publications (Public Administration Review, Public Money and Management, the China Review), 2 manuscripts under review, and 4 in preparation, several publications in Chinese journals,
- Databases created: a sample of collaborative frictions about 1000 cases, a sample of collaborative tensions about 900 samples, and a collaborative dispute database of more than 200 cases

OUTLINE OF THE LECTURE

- Part I: Collaborative disputes
 - The origination, process, and resolution of collaborative disputes
- Part II: Collaborative context
 - The role of sociopolitical and economic circumstances in collaborative actions
- Part III: External imposition in collaboration
 - The role of external forces (such as the central government) in local collaborations



PART I: ON COLLABORATIVE DISPUTES

- Context: A large number of disputes with IC2S since the handover
- Preliminary observations
 - 200+ collaborative disputes (long-last disagreements, example)
 - Technical vs, political split
 - Infrastructure vs. service delivery split
 - Methods of resolutions
 - Strategies of resolutions

Background

- Tendency of the literature to see collaborative capacity building as a linear process that involves share interest identification, trust building, and principled engagement. Little is known on the role of dispute resolution in collaborative capacity building
- A large number of disputes partly due to implementation of one country two systems (1C2S) in the greater bay area (GBA).
- A study to cover the after-1997 period on collaborative projects between Hong kong and the mainland

Unit of Analysis—Collaborative Dispute

Disputes concern institutional **disagreements** encountered by collaborative partners over a **prolonged period of time** that have caused tangible or intangible barriers to the collaboration.

- ✓ the negotiation between collaborative partners;
- ✓ disagreement or difficulties which hinders the next step;
- ✓ A prolonged period of time (different from frictions)

➤ Example 1

- Dispute in environmental area, specially on air pollution standard. 在治理空气污染的过程中，香港议员对“内地继续容忍车辆使用劣质燃料”的**汽车燃料标准**持有意见。

➤ Example 2

- Dispute on contribution of financial resources for the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge. 2006年，港珠澳大桥的建设中，**三方就各自的资金份额上存在分歧**。

➤ Example 3

- Dispute on the collocation of the Express Rail project. 2015年5月，由于内地与香港司法制度不同，广深港高速铁路香港段**能否实施“一地两检”**成为法律界争议焦点。

Data collection

香港特別行政區立法會 - 立法會

Minutes of special meeting of

Minutes of special meeting of

legco.gov.hk/tc/legco-business/council/council-meetings.html#schedule

網站 | 議員 | 委員會 | 法案 | 立法會資料 | 立法會事務 | 議員 | 公開的議會 | 教育服務 | 到訪 | 立法會簡介

ENG | 簡

更新

日期	會議議程	會議安排	投票結果	會議紀要	會議過程正式紀錄	網上廣播
2023年1月11 及 12日	會議議程	CB(3)24/2023	PDF	會議紀要	即場紀錄本 2 中文版 2	網上廣播 2
2023年1月18日	會議議程	CB(3)40/2023	PDF	會議紀要	即場紀錄本 中文版	網上廣播
2023年1月19日 ●	會議議程 議員累積提問 次數	CB(3)40/2023 CB(3)50/2023	-	會議紀要	即場紀錄本 中文版	網上廣播
農曆新年休會						
2023年2月8日	會議議程	CB(3)73/2023	PDF	會議紀要	即場紀錄本 中文版	網上廣播
2023年2月15 及 16日	會議議程	CB(3)102/2023	PDF	會議紀要	即場紀錄本 2 中文版 2	網上廣播 2
2023年2月22日 ■	會議議程	CB(3)130/2023	-	會議紀要	即場紀錄本 中文版	網上廣播

議程項目
出席議員
缺席議員
出席政府官員
列席秘書
提交本會省覽的文件
議員質詢的口頭答覆
議員質詢的書面答覆
議員議案
暫停會議

即

中

PDF

Data collection

立法會 Legislative Council

立法會CB(2)1598/02-03號文件
(此份會議紀要業經政府當局審閱)

檔號：CB2/H/5

立法會內務委員會 特別會議紀要

日期：2003年2月28日(星期五)
時間：下午2時30分
地點：立法會會議廳

出席議員：周梁淑怡議員, GBS, JP (內務委員會主席)
李華明議員, JP (內務委員會副主席)
丁午壽議員, JP
朱幼麟議員, JP
何秀蘭議員
何俊仁議員
何鍾泰議員, JP
李卓人議員
李柱銘議員, SC, JP
李家祥議員, JP
呂明華議員, JP
吳亮星議員, JP
吳靄儀議員
張文光議員

39. 李華明議員提及將於2004年屆滿的1989年供水協議時表示，他曾在2003年2月26日立法會會議上就此事提出質詢，但環境運輸及工務局局長未能提供令人滿意的答覆。李議員詢問應否由更高層次的官員與廣東方面進行談判，因為雙方即使在2001年的供水價格上也未能達成協議。

9

40. 政務司司長表示，他有信心環境運輸及工務局局長可就東江水的價格及供應事宜，與廣東當局達成令人滿意的協議。政務司司長又表示，在最後一刻才達成協議，在商業談判中相當平常。重要的是要有耐性，因為倉卒達成協議並不符合香港的最佳利益。

41. 劉江華議員表示，深圳市市長于幼軍先生曾向傳媒表示會在各方面加強與香港的合作。劉議員詢問，政府當局是否知悉有關的合作計劃，以及兩地在溝通及合作方面有否任何困難。

42. 政務司司長回應時表示，過去雖然存在一些困難，但深圳與香港均積極物色合作項目，並已設立特定的渠道，例如協作會議及統籌小組。政務司

Data collection process

Documents: 113份会议记录（1997年4月10日-2021年2月23日）+ 新闻 + 回忆录类书籍

東江

Summary Reference

File Name	In Folder	References	Coverage
1997年4月10日(星期四)	Files	11	0.16%
1997年5月24日(星期六)	Files	1	0.02%
1998年10月15日(星期四)	Files	2	0.02%
1998年11月16日(星期一)	Files	1	0.02%
1998年2月20日(星期五)	Files	1	0.02%
1999年10月12日(星期二)	Files	9	0.11%
1999年10月13日	Files	1	0.02%
1999年10月13日星期三	Files	1	0.02%
1999年2月5日(星期五)	Files	27	0.25%
1999年3月5日(星期五)	Files	2	0.02%
1999年5月13日(星期四)	Files	1	0.01%



Topic: 水质改善和监管、水价协商、本地水塘储存能力、更换水管、大亚湾核电站对项目的影响、寻找替代供水方案、内地旱灾事件、东江航道、其他

Name 200100

Summary Reference

Files\\2001年
1 reference coded, 10.15% coverage

Reference 1: 10.15% coverage

東江水水質
10.2 劉慧卿議員指出，2001至02年度水質控制方面的撥款為 1億6,880萬元，金額與2000至01年度的修訂預算十分相近，但事實上卻低於當局去年就同一目的原先承擔的款額。鑒於改善東江水水質相當重要，以及各界人士最近曾就建造中的密封式輸水管道系統的成效提出多項問題，她詢問當局有否制訂任何措施以改善水質。
10.3 工務局局長回應時向議員保證，水務署供應的食水完全符合世界生組織訂定的



Name

水质监管

- 199704
- 199705
- 199802
- 199810
- 199902
- 199910
- 200005
- 200010
- 20001002
- 200100
- 200106
- 200210
- 200300
- 200301
- 200510
- 20081028
- 201005
- 201007
- 201301
- 201303
- 201509
- 201510
- 20151009
- 201601
- 201602
- 201604
- 201610
- 201611

Dispute 1

Dispute 2

Data collection-Project category

Field No.	Project Field	Project No.	Project Name
1/T	Transportation Infrastructure	T1	Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge 港珠澳大桥
		T2	Express Railway 广深港高速铁路
		T3	The Hong Kong–Shenzhen Western Corridor 深港西部通道
		T4	Liantang–Heung Yuen Wai Control Point 香园围边境管制站
2/A	Air and Water Protection	A1	Shenzhen River 深圳河治理
		A2	Shenzhen Bay 深圳湾治理
		A3	Dapeng Bay 大鹏湾治理
		A4	...
3/H	Healthcare	H1	Covid-19 新冠疫情
		H2	医疗服务（医疗机构/药品/专业人才）
		H3	...
4/T	Technology and Innovation	T1	粤港科技合作资助计划
		T2	深港科技创新合作区
		T3	广校合作研究计划
		T4	...
5/Y	Youth Education and Development	Y1	香港青年内地实习资助计划
		Y2	内地大学升学资助计划
		Y3	...
6/W	Water & Food Supply	W1	供港食物 (广东供港食品农产品示范区)
		W2	东江供水
		W3	...
7/O	Other	O	《粤港澳大湾区发展规划纲要》、《粤港澳大湾区合作框架协议》、关于大湾区发展办公室的事务.....

Data collection overview

This dataset compiles a total of **213** disputes arising from the cooperation between Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macao since **July 1, 1997**




Figure 1: Number of disputes in different fields

Group definition *Infrastructure vs. Non-Infrastructure*

Infrastructure projects involve a large amount of physical construction work, which often requires substantial amounts of funding and resources. These projects typically involve completing various stages of work within a certain timeframe.

Non-infrastructure (mainly public service delivery) projects tend to focus more on service-oriented projects, such as promoting development in areas. Non-infrastructure projects generally do not have clear timeframes or specific milestones, but instead rely on achieving a series of soft goals and expected outcomes over time.

Table 2: Fields/projects belonging to different groups

Infrastructure	Non-Infrastructure
Transportation Infrastructure	Water and air protection
-	Water & Food supply
-	Healthcare provision
-	Youth Education and Development
-	Technology Innovation
-	Other

Dispute issue

Dispute Issue		Definition	Example
Internal Project Issue	Technical and Operational Issue	Differences or difficulties in technical standards, procedures, operational methods, or systems used by the collaborating governments.	Insufficient manpower in construction of Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge
	Financial Issue	Differences or difficulties in financial contributions, budget allocations, or financial management practices.	Discussion on whether the income from the opening of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge can support its maintenance and management expenses.
External Context Issue	Political and Legal Issue	Differences or difficulties in political ideologies, legal systems, laws, or regulatory frameworks.	Discussion on whether the Hong Kong section of the high-speed rail can implement “one place, two inspections”.
	Social and Cultural Issue	Differences or difficulties in social norms, values, or cultural practices between the societies represented by the collaborating governments.	Discussion on whether mainland regulatory agencies will favor mainland bidding companies.

Source: Author’s elaboration based on Esposito and Terlizzi (2023)

Descriptive Statistics-Group Comparison




Figure 2: Number of disputes with different issues

row	col		Total
	1	2	
1	47	56	103
2	68	42	110
Total	115	98	213

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 5.6108$ Pr = 0.018

For infrastructure projects, it might be beneficial to invest more in technical and financial planning and coordination to prevent internal project disputes.

For non-infrastructure collaborations, efforts could be directed towards understanding and reconciling the political, social, and cultural differences between the partnering governments to mitigate potential disputes.

Project stage

	Definition	Example
Policy Design	Designing policies involves identifying goals and selecting policy instruments with which the goals can be reached.	For the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge project, there is controversy over the site selection of the bridge in the Hong Kong section. In the youth development program, there is a discussion on whether the “Mainland University Admission Subsidy Scheme” will create competition between Guangdong and Hong Kong.
Policy Implementation	Policy implementation is about putting these policies into practice and comprises the definition of an implementation structure, decision-making within agencies, target group behavior, and policy results.	The construction of the Hong Kong section of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge is affected by residents' demands to reexamine the environmental permit. In the Hong Kong youth entrepreneurship program in mainland China, there are concerns about insufficient and effective use of funding support.

Source: Author’s elaboration based on Treib (2018)

Descriptive Statistics-Group Comparison




Figure 3: Number of disputes in policy stage

row	col		Total
	1	2	
1	34	69	103
2	69	41	110
Total	103	110	213

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 18.8107$ Pr = 0.000

In infrastructure collaborations, disputes in technical standards, budget allocations, or other aspects of policy design can lead to disputes early on. This implies that extra attention and resources should be dedicated to the policy design stage.

Non-infrastructure collaborations often involve softer issues like citizen response, where disputes may not surface until the policies are put into practice. This suggests that for non-infrastructure collaborations, continuous monitoring and evaluation during the policy implementation stage is crucial to identify and resolve disputes promptly.

The escalation in **the number of individuals or organizations** participating in policy deliberations often signifies an increased level of complexity (Xie & Zheng, 2003).

Within the sphere of public administration, this challenge is distinctly accentuated owing to the involvement of various interest groups and the imperative to equilibrate their respective appeals.

Descriptive Statistics-Group Comparison

Table 3: Number of Organization involved

Organization Number	Infrastructure	Non-Infrastructure
Average	1.89	1.54
Equal to 1	54 (52.43%)	80 (72.73%)
Equal to 2	22 (21.36%)	17 (15.45%)
Equal to 3	15 (14.56%)	3 (2.73%)
Equal to 4	3 (2.91%)	1 (0.91%)
Equal to or More than 5	9 (8.74%)	9 (8.18%)
Total	103	110

Table 4: Number of Individual involved

Individual Number	Infrastructure	Non-Infrastructure
Average	7.29	3.62
(0, 5]	51 (49.51%)	91 (82.73%)
(5, 10]	26 (25.24%)	15 (13.64%)
(10, 15]	10 (9.71%)	2 (1.82%)
(15, ∞)	16 (7.35%)	2 (1.82%)
Total	103	110

Ha: diff < 0
Pr(T < t) = **0.0153**

Ha: diff != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = **0.0307**


Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T > t) = **0.9847**

Ha: diff < 0
(T < t) = **0.0000**

Ha: diff != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = **0.0000**

Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T > t) = **1.0000**

Descriptive Statistics-Group Comparison



row	col		Total
	1	2	
1	53	50	103
2	74	36	110
Total	127	86	213

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 5.5274$ Pr = 0.019


Average: 1.54 years vs. 1.33 years

Figure 4: Disputes with different duration

Dispute solution

	Definition
Unresolved	Refers to instances where disputes remain unsettled due to lack of consensus, intractable differences, or ineffective dispute resolution mechanisms. The disputes in this category are characterized by prolonged stagnation and lack of progress toward a mutually agreeable solution.
Internal Resolved	Refers to disputes that are resolved within the disputing parties themselves. This typically involves negotiation, compromise, or the use of internal dispute-resolution mechanisms. The key feature of this mode is the independent resolution of conflicts without external intervention, emphasizing the autonomy of the involved parties.
Central Intervened	Refers to disputes that are resolved through the intervention of a central authority. The intervention may come in various forms, such as arbitration, mediation, or directive resolutions. The distinguishing characteristic of this mode is the active involvement of an external entity in facilitating the resolution process.

Descriptive Statistics-Group Comparison



row	col			Total
	1	2	3	
1	2	72	29	103
2	28	61	21	110
Total	30	133	50	213


Pearson $\chi^2(2) = 24.5195$ Pr = 0.000

Figure 5: Disputes solution

Dispute solution

Internal Resolved	Definition	Dispute Example
Legal Conclusion	This refers to resolving disputes by examining and applying existing laws and regulations. It emphasizes the importance of following legal procedures and guidelines in finding a solution.	Solve through legal provisions or construction contracts: Discussion on whether arrestees in Hong Kong can be detained in the Hong Kong inspection area of Shenzhen Bay Port, and discussion on the substandard concrete during the construction of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge.
Communication and negotiation	This involves promoting dialogue and negotiation among the involved parties to foster mutual understanding and find common ground for resolving disputes.	Communicating and negotiating how to hire Hong Kong laborers for the construction of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge.
Implementation of new initiatives	This entails introducing innovative measures or policies aimed at mitigating disputes and addressing underlying causes to prevent recurrence.	Solve water quality problems by building new water mains.

Descriptive Statistics-Group Comparison



row	col			Total
	1	2	3	
1	17	34	21	72
2	2	36	23	61
Total	19	70	44	133

Pearson $\chi^2(2) = 11.1567$ Pr = 0.004


■ Implementation of new initiatives ■ Communication and negotiation

■ Legal Conclusion **Figure 6: Disputes internal solution**

Dispute solution

Central Intervened	Definition	Example
Central facilitation (Coordination group)	Refers to a method of resolving government disputes through discussions and negotiations within a coordination group facilitated by the involvement of central officials. The central government plays a supportive role in facilitating dialogue and cooperation among the involved parties, with the aim of reaching a mutually agreeable solution.	Facilitating discussion on toll pricing strategy and adjustment mechanisms.
Central decision-making	Entails the resolution of government disputes through direct decision-making or leadership by the central government. In this approach, the central government plays a significant role in mediating and determining the outcome of the dispute, often based on legal frameworks, policies, or strategic considerations.	The central government decided to adopt a single “Y”-shaped construction for the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge.
Central resource support	Involves the provision of resources, including funding, supplies, and expertise by the central government, to assist in resolving government disputes.	The central government (the Ministry of Science and Technology) provided special funding in resolving key technology challenges in HZMB.
Central authorization	The central government delegates authority to local or regional governments, granting them the jurisdiction and power to address	Authorize Guangdong to carry out pilot projects

Descriptive Statistics-Group Comparison



row	col				Total
	1	2	3	4	
1	15	12	2	0	29
2	9	1	8	3	21
Total	24	13	10	3	50

Pearson $\chi^2(3) = 16.5514$ Pr = 0.001

- Central facilitation
- Central decision-making
- Central resource support
- Central authorization

Figure 7: Disputes central intervened

Descriptive Statistics-Group Comparison

Table 3: Institutional development

	Infrastructure	Non- infrastructure
Institutional development	11	8
_co-ordination group (design)	7 (63.64%)	1 (12.5%)
_work group (implementation)	4 (36.36%)	7 (87.5%)
Non-institutional development (one-off)	18	13
Total	29	21





Figure 3: Number of disputes in policy stage

Findings

	Infrastructure	Non-Infrastructure (service delivery)
Dispute Issue	More Internal Project Issue	More External Context Issue
Dispute concentrated on	Policy Design	Policy Implementation
Complexity and duration time	Higher and longer	Lower and shorter
Dispute ending	Almost dispute resolved	Some dispute remained
Central intervention (Main methods)	Higher (Facilitating or leading decision-making)	Lower (Providing resource and facilitating)
Internal solution	Using project contracts/legal provisions as the basis for resolving disputes	Mainly focused on enhancing understanding (compromising) or implementing new solutions

PART II: CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCES

- The issue: a significant factor in GBA collaboration practices but hardly mentioned in the literature
- Key observations
 - The complex but critical role of sociopolitical development in influencing collaborations
 - The role of economic and financial fluctuations in Hong Kong an open global financial market, a consideration in collaborations
 - The contribution to the theory



STUDY BACKGROUND

- Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau (HZMB) Bridge project, study period 2003 to 2017 (planning and construction phases)
- Collaborative tensions that occurred in Hong Kong legislation,
- Tensions are defined as the concerns raised by policy leaders (legislators, in this study) regarding a certain aspect of the HZMB collaboration. N=890
- A sense making perspective on political leadership actions

Sensemaking components	Period		
	2003–2005	2006–2009	2010–2017
Major contextual events	Hong Kong, July 1 civil protest marches, 2003–2005, for fear of loss of political freedoms	- Beijing Olympics, 2008 - Central government’s support in the financial crisis, 2008	- Citizen protests against the National Education Act, 2012 “Occupy Central” and the “Umbrella Movement,” 2014–2015
Noticing cues from events	Highlighted differences in the laws, regulations, institutions, procedures, and construction standards between Hong Kong and the mainland (Legislative Council 2003).	Impressions expressed on practices in the mainland, especially on the transparency of the project information as well as the central government’s support for Hong Kong in the financial crisis and the HZMB collaboration (Legislative Council 2009c).	Increasing negative responses to issues related to the mainland, such as the decline in commercial and passenger traffic between Hong Kong and the mainland (Legislative Council 2015a).
Interpreting with plausible explanations	The above differences made HZMB-related tasks challenging, requiring the safeguarding of Hong Kong interests (Legislative Council 2003).	The mainland companies involved in the HZMB project were trustworthy and the project should be implemented as soon as possible, to bolster its long-term strategic value (Legislative Council 2009c).	The HZMB is a “white elephant” and a waste of public money (Legislative Council 2016).
Taking collective actions	Rigorous review and evaluation of the HZMB were issued for construction.	Motions related to the HZMB were passed without strong resistance.	Funding-delaying tactics such as legislative filibustering were employed by some legislators to delay or halt the project.

KEY FINDINGS

- **Sociopolitical context is associated with institutional tensions**
- **Economic or financial context is associated with institutional tensions.**
- **The potential impact of sociopolitical events on collaborative tensions is moderated by economic or financial development.**
- **Political identity of legislators moderates the association between contextual influence and institutional tensions.**




FIGURE 1 How contextual influence interacts with collaboration dynamics— the Contextual Dynamic Collaboration (CDC) model further specified in the Discussion section of this study.

PROPOSITIONS

- *Proposition 1: Contextual influence over collaboration is realized through policy leadership behaviors and attributes.*
- *Proposition 2: The adaptability of a contextual dynamic collaborative (CDC) model is associated with the magnitude of contextual changes. The greater the changes, the more powerful the model is for explaining the drivers of collaborative dynamics.*
- *Proposition 3: Contextual factors influence collaborative dynamics through stakeholders' escalating or de-escalating collaborative tensions.*
- *Proposition 4: The sociopolitical context has a greater impact on collaborative dynamics than changes in other types of contexts, such as economic, cultural, and ecological.*

Table 1 Regression results

DVs (Tension types)	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Sociopolitical context	-4.5029*** (1.006)	-3.4295 (2.930)	-2.5108* (1.487)	-4.4253*** (1.009)
Economic context	-.2107*** (.076)	-.0207 (.494)	-.2028*** (.075)	-.1565 (.105)
Political identity	.6624*** (.166)	.6722*** (.168)	2.3890** (1.001)	.9546** (.428)
Gender	.6445*** (.211)	.6361*** (.212)	.6515*** (.211)	.6565*** (.212)
Project stage	-.5769*** (.170)	-.5331*** (.203)	-.5817*** (.170)	-.5739*** (.170)
Sociopolitical context × Economic context		-.3063 (.788)		
Sociopolitical context × Political identity			-3.1804* (1.812)	
Economic context × Political identity				-.0889 (.120)
(Pseudo-) R²	.0574	.0575	.060	.0579
Observation	890	890	890	890

Table 1 (continued) Regression results

DVs (Tension levels)	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Sociopolitical context	-3.5153***	-8.8306***	-3.3282**	-3.3908***
	(1.043)	(3.020)	(1.456)	(1.044)
Economic context	-.0144	-.9501*	-1.014	.0977
	(.076)	(.505)	(.076)	(.100)
Political identity	.9619***	.9093***	1.1438	1.6599***
	(.173)	(.175)	(1.003)	(.440)
Gender	-.1726	-.1348	-.1710	-.1336
	(.209)	(.210)	(.209)	(.210)
Project stage	.3943**	.1711	.3930**	.3888**
	(.182)	(.217)	(.182)	(.182)
Tension type	-.2279	-.2294	-.2304	-.2412
	(.168)	(.168)	(.169)	(.168)
Sociopolitical context × Economic context		1.4752*		
		(.787)		
Sociopolitical context × Political identity			-3.3292	
			(1.787)	
Economic context × Political identity				-.2077*
				(.120)
(Pseudo-) R^2	.095	.098	.095	.098
Observation	870	870	870	870

Finding 3

The potential impact of sociopolitical events on collaborative tensions is moderated by economic development (Model 6 in Table 2).




FIGURE 3 Economic contextual influence on the association between sociopolitical contextual influence and tension level.

Finding 4

Political identity of legislators moderates the association between contextual influence and institutional tensions (Model 3 in Table 1).




FIGURE 3 Political identity mitigates the association between sociopolitical contextual influence and tension levels.

PART III: EXTERNAL IMPOSITION

- The background: a powerful central government in planning and implementation of collaborative activities in GBA
- Key observations
 - Providing a quicker solution but with a potential benefit loss of prolonged negotiations
 - Long term impact is uncertain
 - Significant theoretical contribution to the field (PAR article)

HISTORY

- Before 1997: service provision, in for example food, water supply, construction raw materials, etc through contractual agreements
- Between 1997 and about 2020 (National Security Law): large transportation infrastructures (e.g., HZMB) and public services (e.g., air pollution control), through institutionalization/authorities
- From 2020: collaborations in more strategic areas such as technology and innovation, education, and cultural development



	A	B	C	D	E
1	Collaboration Format	Policy Field	Cases	Information	
2	粤港合作联席会议 / 粤港合作框架协议	跨界基建	港珠澳大桥	/	
3			广深港高速铁路	/	
4			一地两检	/	
5			莲塘口岸	/	
6		环境保护	区域空气质素（清潔生產伙伴計劃、粤港澳珠江三角洲区域空气监测网络）	https://www.legco.gov.hk/database/chinese/data_ea/ea-regional-air-quality.htm	
7			自然保育（林業、濕地、生物多樣性）（生態走廊、大鵬灣及后海湾（深圳灣）区域环境管理）	https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr18-19/chinese/panels/ea/papers/ea20181022cb1-10-1-c.pdf	
8			海洋资源护理（海上垃圾通報機制）	https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr20-	
9			东江水质保护	https://www.legco.gov.hk/database/chinese/data_ea/ea-quality-dongjiang-water.htm	
10			可再生能源（香港與珠三角城市合作發展可再生能源項目）	https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/chinese/counmtg/hansard/cm1028-translate-	
11		物資供給	供港食物（廣東供港食品農產品示範區）	https://www.legco.gov.hk/database/chinese/data_fseh/fseh-food-surveillance-programme.htm	
12			东江供水	https://www.legco.gov.hk/database/chinese/data_ea/ea-quality-dongjiang-water.htm	
13			能源合作（西氣東輸二線工程）	https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/chinese/panels/edev/papers/edev0108-enbcr345760512pt15-c.pdf	二零零八年八月二十八日，中央政府國家能源局與香港特別行政區政府簽訂《能源合作諒解備忘錄》，雙方原則上同意研究包括經西二線向香港供應天然氣的可行性。
			創新及科技基金：廠校合作研究計劃、合作研究的等額補助金、客席研究員產業研究計劃、粵港科技合作資助計劃	https://www.legco.gov.hk/database/chinese/data_ci/ci-itf.htm	1999年，在行政長官特設創新科技委員會（委員會）首份報告建議設立創新及科技基金，以顯示政府推行促進創新及科技的政策和策略的決心，並為




COLLABORATIVE DISPUTES AND FRICTIONS

- About 25 to 30 major government-to-government collaborative projects
- 213 Collaborative disputes
- In four collaborative transportation projects, 965 collaborative frictions

Number of disputes in different fields

Dispute Field	Number	Percentage
Transportation	106	48.85%
Environment	24	11.06%
Water & Food	16	7.37%
Health	15	6.91%
Education	22	10.14%
Technology	5	2.30%
General Agreement	29	13.36%
Total	217	100.00%



POTENTIAL CAUSES OF DISPUTES

- Distinctive in two systems, associated with the one-country-two-system structure (e.g., the the co-location decision in the High-speed Railway 高铁一地两检)
- Distinctive in external contextual influences (vs. internal design factors)
 - Central government's role
 - Sociopolitical factors

RESEARCH SETTING AND DATA

- Four large collaborative transportation infrastructure projects between Hong Kong and local governments including 港珠澳大桥
- Disputes and disagreements among partners, at a disaggregated level defined as “collaborative friction” in this study. N=965

A FEW RESEARCH NOTES


- Three institutional scenarios in the Chinese context concerning the role of central government in local policy implementation capacity-building (Wang and Xu, 2022, Public Money and Management)—warlike 战时, campaign-style 运动式, and normal 常态化
- The central government's involuntary engagement in the **normal** policy circumstance (transportation, education, social services etc.) is the context of this study





KEY FINDINGS

- a local policy implementation obstacle becomes a salient candidate for central intervention when local political disputes accumulate to indicate a significant outcome for the engagement.
- Frequency and patterns in frictions– collaborative frictions and disputes happen much more in certain projects (e.g., the high-speed railway) and certain phases (e.g., the project planning phase)
- Issue nature (e.g., political, economic, environmental etc)
- Perceived impact if not resolved quickly (project delay, financial deadlock, service disruption etc)



CERTAIN ISSUES (POLITICAL/SECURITY)

- Frictions of political or legal in nature accumulate to indicate a significant outcome for the engagement.
- An example is the co-location decision of the high-speed railway project （高铁一地两检）
- Another example is the 2020 enforcement of the National Security Law in Hong Kong due to national security concerns and civil unrest




CONCERNS OF THE COSTS

- Perceived impact if not resolved quickly
- Schedule delay, budget process deadlock, or construction obstacle or service disruption etc
- Budget filibustering


Findings

Figure 1. Frequency (Concentration) of Frictions and Central Interventions



Findings

Figure 2. Nature (Context) of Frictions and Central Interventions



Findings

Table 4. Perceived Consequences of Frictions

	Interventions (All Projects)	Interventions (Railway)
Schedule Delay		
Yes	178 of 707 (25.2%)	174 of 417 (42.1%)
No	27 of 226 (11.9%)	15 of 132 (11.4%)
Chi-square (sig)	17.484 (.000)	41.801 (.000)
Kendall tau-b (sig)	.137 (.000)	.277 (.000)
Financial Obstacles		
Yes	8 of 429 (1.9%)	0 of 177
No	5 of 81 (6.2%)	0 of 0
Chi-square (sig)	5.091 (.024)	NA (see note)
Kendall tau-b (sig)	-.100(.121)	NA
Service Disruption		
Yes	186 of 650 (28.6%)	174 of 484 (36.1%)
No	8 of 209 (3.8%)	0 of 0
Chi-square (sig)	55.58 (.000)	NA
Kendall tau-b (sig)	.254 (.000)	NA

STRATEGIES OF CENTRAL ENGAGEMENT (DISPUTE DATA)

	Number	Percentage
Mandate	10	18.18%
Mobilizing resources-knowledge	1	1.82%
Mobilizing resources-material	5	9.09%
Mobilizing resources-combine	9	16.36%
Facilitating, controlling and other ways	30	54.55%
Total	55	100%

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERVENTION (DISPUTE DATA)

	Number	Percentage
Intervened through a new institution (Policy committees / work group)	19	34.55%
Intervened through other ways	36	65.45%
Total	55	100%



PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS

- The need for central engagement may increase with growing local collaborative efforts in China (environmental, public health policy etc), but normally, central engagement is costly (the high opportunity cost) so it is relatively rare
- Understanding when and why the central government engages is important to understanding the capacity-building process in China

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION

- External intervention is normally not discussed in collaborative settings which tend to be voluntary in most contexts in the literature; this research contributes to the theory building in this sense
- This study is part of an ongoing effort that looks into the cause, process, and outcome of external imposition



SOME THOUGHTS ON FUTURE RESEARCH ON GBA COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE

- Collaboration failures
- Collaborative capacity building process
- Collaborations in different policy domains
- Method innovations
- On policy implications
 - Do we want collaboration or competition in GBA as the dominated mode of development?
 - Why so difficult to collaborative, let alone integrate?
 - Articulating advantages is not easy

RELATED PUBLICATIONS IN ENGLISH

- Influence of external authorities on collaborative frictions (2023), **Public Administration Review** 83(3): 603-622
- Debate: the central government's capacity building role in policy implementation in China (2021), **Public Money and Management** 42(2): 57-58
- Chinese Central Government Intervention in Local Policy Implementation Capacity Building—When and Why, **The China Review** (forthcoming)

THANKS AND Q&AS